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PROBABILITY THEORY MEETS RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR 
David Kaye*t 
Day in and day out, attorneys, judges, and jurors must esti-
mate probabilities. No, the jury decides, it is not very likely that 
the fashionable physician murdered his elderly patients to expe-
dite his receipt of their legacies. Yes, the prosecutor insists, the 
senator must have known that the cash contribution he accepted 
was the gift of a foreign national. No, the expert witness testifies, 
chances are that the plane crash that left the plaintiff a penniless 
widow was the result not of pilot error but rather of an unexpected 
summer squall. 
To be sure, we rarely quantify such estimates of probability 
and almost never adopt the terminology and mathematics of 
probability theory to resolve such matters. Nevertheless, the 
mathematical theory of probability• can be, and has been, ap-
plied to legal problems in various ways. Some have used the 
theory descriptively, to model the reasoning of jurors2 or the rules 
of evidence.3 Others have used it normatively, to urge reforms in 
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.B. 1968, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; A.M. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1972, Yale University. - Ed. 
t A version of this paper was presented at a session of the Faculty Workshop Pro• 
gram of the School of Law at the University of Washington, and I am grateful to those 
who participated for their preparation, criticisms, and insights. I would also like to thank 
Edward Cleary, Dennis Karjala, Willard Pedrick, and especially Richard Lempert for 
their comments on an earlier version of this Article. 
1. By the mathematical theory of probability, I mean the axiomatic description of' 
probability spaces conventionally accepted by mathematicians. See, e.g., H. BRUNK, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 21-31 (1965). On the epistemological problems 
with the concept of probability, see, e.g., T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY: AN EXAMINA-
TION OF FOUNDATIONS (1973); H, KYBURG, THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL 
INFERENCE (1974), 
2. See, e.g., Iversen, Operationalizing the Concept of Probability in Legal-Social 
Science Research, 5 LAw & Socv. REv. 331 (1971); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens 
of Proof; A View from the Bench, Bar and Classroom, 5 LAw & Socv. REv. 319 (1971); 
Simon, "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"-An Experimental Attempt at Quantification, 6 
J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCI. 203 (1970). 
3. See, e.g., L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (arguing that a non-
standard theory of inductive probability must be developed to describe the rules of evi-
dence); Boole, On the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to "the Question of the 
Combination of Testimonies or Judgments, 21 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL Soc1ETY OF 
EDINBURGH 597 (1857); Schum, On the Behavioral Richness of Cascaded Inference Models: 
Examples in Jurisprudence, in COGNITIVE THEORY 149 (N. Castellan ed. 1977). 
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the treatment of quantitative evidence4 or in the framing of legal 
rules.5 Still others have used it heuristically, to explain rules gov-
erning proof of facts. 6 
This Article uses probability theory normatively in an effort 
to clarify one aspect of the famous tort doctrine known as res ipsa 
loquitur. It does not urge that jurors be instructed in probability 
theory or be equipped with microprocessors. Rather, it seeks an 
accurate statement of the res ipsa doctrine in ordinary language. 
In particular, this Article will show that the conventional formu-
lation of the doctrine is misleading at best, and should be re-
placed with a more careful statement of the conditions warrant-
ing the res ipsa inference. 7 To this end, Section I briefly surveys 
4. See, e.g., Fairley, Probabilistic Analysis of Indentification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 493 (1973); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Note, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 
59 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (1971). 
5. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research 
and the Jury Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975); Zeise!, ... And Then There Were 
None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38U. Cm. L. REv. 710 (1971); Note, The Effect 
of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 529 (1971). 
Probability calculations are sometimes used in another, arguably normative sense; in 
appropriate cases, they are introduced to prove disputed facts, such as the presence of 
discrimination in the selection of a jury venire or in the hiring of employees. For examples 
and discussion of jury venire cases, see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Salary 
v. Wilson, 415 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969); De Cani, Statistical Evidence in Jury Discrimina-
tion Cases, 65 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1974); Zeise!, Dr. Spock and the Case of 
the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1969); Finkelstein, The Application 
of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 338 
(1966). For discussions of employment discrimination cases, see Shoben, Differential Pass-
Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 
793 (1978); Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures 
with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEXAS L. REv:·1 (1977); Note, Beyond 
the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 
89 HARV. L. REv. 387 (1975). 
6. See, e.g., Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977); Kaplan, 
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968); Kornstein, A 
Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD, 121 (1976); cf. Note, A Probabilistic 
Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612 (1978) 
(upholding mutuality through heuristic use of probability theory). This use of probability 
theory as a heuristic device combines the descriptive and normative modes of discourse. 
Where the mathematical model accounts for the legal rules, it tends to justify the law; 
where the legal phenomena cannot be reconciled with the model, the law tends to be 
perceived as irrational and in need of revision. 
7. In discussing how the res ipsa doctrine should be phrased, and hence what a jury 
should be told (or what standard a judge as factfinder should use), this Article assumes 
that rationality - as generally defined in decision theory or economic theory - is the only 
relevant normative criterion. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS 
ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1977); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN,•ThEORY OF GAMES AND 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1947). As has been noted elsewhere, although we arguably 
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the legal doctrine, or, more precisely, the aspect of the doctrine 
that will be criticized. Section II develops a mathematical appa-
ratus and uses it to expose the weakness in the current version of 
res ipsa loquitur. Finally, Section ID summarizes and elaborates 
the conclusions reached-in Section II - conclusions that suggest 
which cases should reach a jury and what instructions the jury 
should receive. 
Despite the introduction of mathematical terminology, these 
conclusions are by no means the product of a rigorous, impregna-
ble argument. They rest on the sort of rough generalizations 
about people and things that are common to all legal arguments. 
Furthermore, the version of the res ipsa doctrine advocated here 
does not correspond exactly to the ideal mathematical formula-
tion. But even if the recommended changes in the res ipsa doc-
trine are controversial, this excursion into the mathematics of 
probability will compel us to think clearly about a subject often 
beset with beguilingly simple but potentially confusing phraseol-
ogy. Indeed, it may be in this regard that we can gain most from 
the exercise. 
I. THE LEGAL DOCTRINE 
The latinism "res ipsa loquitur" appears to have been intro-
duced into the law of torts by Chief Baron Pollock more than a 
century ago. In Byrne v. Boadle, 8 a case brought by a hapless 
pedestrian injured by a barrel of flour that tumbled from a win-
dow in the defendant's warehouse, Pollock observed: "There are 
certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur . . . . 
[T]he mere fact of an accident's having occurred is evidence of 
negligence . . . . " 9 As this seminal statement of the doctrine 
makes plain, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evi-
dence.10 It permits a jury to infer from a circumstance - the 
employ jurors in large part to inject concerns other than rationality into the factfinding 
process, the normative model embodied in homo economicus is the one appropriately used 
in most discussions of jury factfinding. See Lempert, supra note 6, at 1023 n.14. 
8. 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). 
9. 2 H. & C. at 725, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300 (oral argument), reprinted in W. PROSSER, 
J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 251, 252 (6th ed. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ]. For recent cases applying res ipsn to 
falling objects, see, e.g., Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29,574 P.2d 822 (1978); 
Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965). 
10. See, e.g., Eaton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 103 Ariz. 461, 463, 
445 P.2d 437, 439 (1968); Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 611, 327 A.2d 94, 99 
(1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.5, at 1079 (1956) [hereinafter 
cited as HARPER & JAMES]. 
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injury to the piaintiff - that the defendant was negligent. 11 In the 
abstract, this inference seems reasonable enough. Surely, some 
accidents could hardly happen unless someone is at fault. 12 
The problem for developing a workable If.gal doctrine lies in 
specifying which accidents are of this character. The all-but-
universally accepted formulation, codified in section 328 D of the 
Restatement of Torts, provides: 
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by 
negligence of the defendant when . . . the event is of a kind which 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence. . . . 13 
11. This, at least, describes the general rule. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 46, 49 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D, Comment b, at 157 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The procedural effect of the inference varies some-
what among jurisdictions and fact situations. See, e.g., Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 
S.W.2d 245, 251-52 (Tex. 1974); RESTATEMENT, supra, § 328 D, Comment d, at 158 & 
Comment m, at 165; PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 278-79. 
12. In some instances, res ipsa may be applied even though this empirical foundation 
is lacking. The ability of defendants in similar cases to supply probative evidence, com-
bined with the inability of plaintiffs to do so, may support a rule that permits an inference 
against defendants. Suppose, for instance, that commercial aircraft frequently crash de-
spite reasonable care on the part of the carrier, and that negligence rather than strict 
liability governs the cause of action. A court might still wish to allow the inference of 
negligence to encourage commercial carriers to install recording equipment that might be 
salvageable and might suggest the causes of at least some crashes. Most cases that have 
held res ipsa inapplicable to unexplained airplane crashes, however, have simply rejected 
the premise that aircraft frequently crash only if someone has been negligent. See, e.g., 
Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. on other 
grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th C.ir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 
(Alaska 1978). For a commentary emphasizing the superior knowledge rationale for res 
ipsa, see, e.g., M. SHAIN, RES lPSA LOQUITUR (1945); Jaffe, Res lpsa Loquitur Vindicated, 
1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1951); Carpenter, Res lpsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder to Professor 
Prosser, 10 S. CAL. L. REv. 467 (1937). 
13. In addition, the Restatement contains provisos linking the defendant with the 
inferred negligence. Section 328 D also requires that "(b) other responsible causes, includ-
ing the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the 
evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to 
the plaintiff." RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, at 156. In speaking of "sufficiently 
eliminating" some other possible causes apparently compatible with reasonable care by 
everyone involved, subsection (b) overlaps subsection (a). 
The Restatement formulation or minor variations of it are ubiquitously followed. See, 
e.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978); Jackson v. H.H. 
Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 574 P.2d 822 (1978); Renfro v. J.D. Coggins Co., 71 N.M. 310, 
378 P.2d 130 (1963); Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968); Gilbert v. 
Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (Pa. 1974); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12-561 (1976). 
One common variant is supplied by both Prosser and Wigmore. Those authors state that 
for the inference of negligence to be permitted, 
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in"the absence of 
someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within 
the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any volun-
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This formulation seems so obviously correct and so well en-
trenched as to be beyond the pale of serious criticism. Indeed, it 
serves well enough in the preponderance of cases. Nevertheless, 
courts have generated a bewildering variety of verbiage in deter-
mining what makes an accident the type that does not ordinarily 
occur in the absence of someone's negligence. 14 Some have sug-
gested that all possible causes of the accident except for negli-
gence must be "excluded,"15 or "sufficiently eliminated,"16 or that 
the likelihood of these other causes must be "so reduced that the 
jury can reasonably find" negligence, 17 or that the plaintiff must 
exhibit a "balance of the probabilities" favoring negligence.'N 
tary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 39, at 214 (4th ed. 1971); 4 J. WmMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905). See also HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10, § 19.6, at 1081. 
14. The Restatement conspicuously fails to supply any standard for ascertaining 
when an event is of this kind. The commentary to § 328 D explains only that there must 
be "a basis of past experience which reasonably permits" this conclusion. REsTATEMENT, 
supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment c, at 158. Similarly, most courts have been content 
to rely on the proposition that "general knowledge" or expert testimony is sufficient to 
make the necessary showing. E.g., Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473, 476 (6th 
Cir. 1955); Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 (Alaska 1978); Jackson 
v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 32, 574 P.2d 822, 825 (1978); Cox v. Wilson, 267 
S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1954); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. 1974). See 
also REsTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment d, at 158-59. 
15. E.g., Weaver v. Shell Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 643, 57 P.2d 571, 572-73 (1936); Martin 
v. Powell, 101 So. 2d 610 (Fla. App. 1958); Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corleyn, 265 Ky, 
308, 96 S.W.2d 860, 865 (1936). 
16. E.g., Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 614, 327 A.2d 94, 101 (1974); cf. 
REsTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D (1) (b) (incorporating a similar requirement). 
17. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974). 
18. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Life Mar. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 261 Or. 473, 477, 495 P.2d 
265, 267 (1972); Siverson,v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962); 
Tucker v. Lombardo, 47 Cal. 2d 457, 465, 303 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1956); Zentz v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 442, 247 P.2d 344, 347 (1952). Of all the articulations of what 
must be "generally known" or attested to by an expert, the most popular seems to be this 
"balance of the probabilities" test. Certainly, most modem cases that analyze res ipsa in 
such detail seem to propound that approach. See, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 684 P.2d 1138, 
1139 (Alaska 1978); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 642, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975); 
Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968). Furthermore, commentary appears 
to favor the "balance of the probabilities" test. See, e.g., HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10, 
§ 19.5, at 1078. When courts adopt this nomenclature, however, they may be referring to 
either of two balances: (1) the balance between (a) the probability that an accident will 
occur if someone is negligent and (b) the probability that an accident will occur if no one 
is negligent; or (2) the balance between (c) the probability that defendant was negligent 
given that the accident occurred and (d) the probability that defendant was not negligent 
given that the accident occurred. Most courts seem to contemplate the second relationship 
when they talk of balancing probabilities. See, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 684 P.2d 1138, 
1139 (Alaska 1978); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. 1974) ("It is 
sufficient if .•• the negligence . . • probably occurred, so that the reasonable probabili-
ties point to the defendant ..•. "); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 328 D, Comment e, at 
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Even more distressingly, the very phrase "ordinarily does not 
occur in the absence of negligence," if taken literally, inaccur-
ately specifies when the res ipsa inference of negligence is empiri-
cally well-founded. 
The difficulty with the phrase "ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence" is most evident in cases concerning 
accidents that take place only infrequently. In the bulk of these 
cases, the courts recognize that the rarity of the injury does not 
alone imply negligence. For instance, in one well-known case, 
Brannon v. Wood, 19 a man went into a·hospital to have a tumor 
(specifically, a meningocele) removed from the back of his chest 
and came out paralyzed from the waist down. The paralysis re-
sulted from emergency measures taken to halt internal hemor-
rhaging at the site of the excised tumor, near the spinal cord.20 
The trial court not only refused to instruct the jury along res ipsa 
lines, but also propounded the defendant physician's proposed 
instruction that the mere existence of the injury was no evidence 
of negligence. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, purportedly 
because the plaintiff had not shown that his injury was the sort 
that "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence. "21 "The test," the court emphasized, "is not whether a 
particular injury rarely occurs, but rather, when it occurs, is it 
ordinarily the result of negligence. "22 "Ordinarily the result of 
159 ("Where the probabilities are at best evenly divided between negligence and its 
absence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury that there is no sufficient 
proof. . . . It is enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that 
negligence is the more probable explanation."). A number of courts; however, can be 
understood to concern themselves with the first two probabilities, apparently assuming 
that if probability (a) is greater than probability (b), then probability (c) is large enough 
to support a finding of negligence. This Article disputes that assumption. 
19. 251 .Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968), reprinted in PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 9, at 257-62. 
20. Many medical procedures, like the surgery in Brannon, are generally accepted as 
appropriate therapy although they carry some risk of serious complications. Cancer chem-
otherapy is potentially immunosuppressive and may impair important host defenses. 
Bakemeier, Principles of Medical Oncology and Ca7!cer Chemotherapy, in CLINICAL ON-
COLOGY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS AND PHYSICIANS 90, 94 (4th ed. 1974). Pertussis vaccine 
sometimes induces brain damage, convulsions, and a strange screaming phenomenon in 
infants. Mortimer, Immunization Against Infectious Disease, 200 SCIENCE 902, 906 (1978). 
Renal transplantation may be followed by persistent hyperparathyroidism, necessitating 
further surgery. Merril & Carpenter, Transplantation, in HARrusoN's PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NAL MEDICINE 359, 365 (7th ed. 1974). Prolonged treatment with antipsychotic medications 
can result, irreversibly, in the movement disorder tardive dyskinesia. Berger, Medical 
Treatment of Mental Illness, 200 SCIENCE 974, 977 (1978). 
21. 251 Or. at 355, 444 P.2d at 561. 
22. 251 Or. at 358, 444 P.2d at 562 (citation omitted). 
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negligence," the court finally stated, means simply "more likely 
the result of negligence than some other cause. "23 Since neither 
general knowledge nor expert testimony revealed that the 
paralysis was more likely to result from negligence than from 
another cause, the court concluded that the plaintiff invoked res 
ipsa loquitur in vain.24 
In a number of cases, however, the courts treat the question 
of what "ordinarily" occurs in the absence of negligence quite 
differently. In Dacus v. Miller, 25 for instance, the Oregon Su-
preme Court again considered a plaintiff who had suffered 
paralysis following surgery.26 This time, however, the plaintiff 
had secured an expert to testify that if due care were exercised 
in the type of operation involved, paralysis would not "ordinarily 
occur."27 Apparently bemused by the words "ordinarily occur," 
the court held that this testimony was adequate to establish neg-
ligence. 28 Thus, Dacus creates telling evidence of malpractice 
from the mere fact that complications of surgery are rare, and 
23. 251 Or. at 361, 444 P.2d at 563. 
24. For comparable cases, see, e.g., Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962); Sommers v. Sisters of Charity, 277 Or. 549, 554-55, 561 P.2d 603, 
606-07 (1977); Austin v. Sisters of Charity, 256 Or. 179, 187-88, 470 P.2d 939, 943 (1970), 
25. 257 Or. 337, 479 P.2d 229 (1971). 
26. The defendant physician had performed a radical mastoidectomy revision, during 
which he removed a mass of cholesteatoma. He admitted that during this surgery, the 
plaintiffs left facial nerve was injured, causing partial facial paralysis, but contended that 
such injury to the facial nerve was an inherent risk of the surgery. There was no claim 
that the surgery itself was unnecessary or that the patient had not been adequately 
informed of the risk. 
27. 257 Or. at 339-41, 479 P.2d at 230-31. The surgeon who performed the corrective 
surgery testified that he had performed 1,500 to 2,000 middle ear surgeries, including 
about 35 operations to correct facial nerve injuries. 257 Or. at 340 nn. 1 & 3, 479 P.2d at 
230 n.1, 231 n.3. Several experts testified that injury to the facial nerve was an " 'inherent 
risk'" in radical mastoidectomies, but rarely occurred. 257 Or. at 341, 479 P.2d at 230-
31. 
28. 257 Or. at 339-41, 479 P.2d at 230-31. The trial court refused to give a res ipsa 
instruction, and the jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, urging in part 
that an adequate foundation for res ipsa had been laid. The supreme court agreed, but 
nonetheless affirmed on the theory that the instruction requested by the plaintiff was 
defective in form and, for that reason, should not have been given. 257 Or. at 341-44, 497 
P.2d at 231-32. 
One member of the court, Chief Justice O'Connell, recognized that the expert testi-
mony about what "ordinarily" occurs did not imply that injury to the facial nerve in 
radical mastoidectomies is more likely the result of negligence than of "inherent risk" in 
the operation. His concurring opinion follows the Brannon logic in substituting, without 
explanation, the latter consideration for the canonical "ordinarily does not occur in the 
absence of negligence." Compare 257 Or. at 345-46, 479 P.2d at 233 (O'Connell, C.J., 
concurring) with Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 360-61, 444 P.2d 558, 563 (1968). 
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hence do not "ordinarily" occur if reasonable care is exercised.29 
This reasoning from the premise that an injury is unusual to 
the conclusion that it does not ordinarily occ.ur in the absence of 
negligence - reasoning by no means confined to medical mal-
practice cases30 ...:_ is surely suspect. Yet the fallacy is not easily 
exposed by recourse to the traditional "ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of negligence" language. Contrary to the Brannon 
court's pronouncement, this phrase is not quite the same as 
"more likely the result of negligence than some other cause." To 
explain why not in detail is the burden of the next Section, but 
it may be helpful to sketch a facet of the difficulty here. Suppose 
we try to rewrite each proposition as a statement about probabili-
ties. The proposition that an injury does not ordinarily occur in 
the absence of negligence is equivalent to the proposition that the 
injury is rare if reasonable care is exercised. This statement, in 
turn, means that the probability of the injury given reasonable 
care is small, 31 and it is what was testified to in Dacus. On the 
other hand, the proposition that an injury is more likely the result 
of negligence than of some other cause - the proposition tha_t the 
court said was not made out in Brannon - seems to express a 
relationship between two quite different probabilities. This 
Brannon proposition seems to mean that, given the injury, the 
probability that the defendant was negligent exceeds the proba-
bility that the defendant exercised reasona\}le care.32 Or that 
same proposition may relate to the converse of those conditional 
probabilities; it would then state that.the probability of injury 
given negligence is larger than that of injury given reasonable 
29. In a footnote, the Dacus court evinced some uncertainty over the relationship 
between the Mayor-Dacus line of cases and Brannon. 257 Or. at 340 n.2, 479 P.2d at 230 
n.2. 
30. See, e.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 14 (Alaska 1978); St. 
Paul Fire & Life Mar. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 261 Or. 473, 477, 495 P.2d 265, 267 (1972). 
31. I£ could be maintained that "ordinarily does not occur" is not equivalent to 
"rarely occurs," but only to "occurs less than half the time." Cf. Higginbotham v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 430 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 
(1978) (res ipsa applied to one of several defendants). Reliance on this weaker sense of 
"ordinarily" only makes the problem worse. Unless complications arise more often than 
not, they "ordinarily" do not occur in the weak sense of the word. If they "ordinarily" do 
not occur, then certainly they "ordinarily" do not occur when reasonable care is taken. 
Hence, on this interpretation of "ordinarily does not occur," res ipsa is available for any 
medical procedure except one that is beset by complications in more than 50% of its 
applications. 
32. This is tantamount to saying that the probability of negligence given the fact of 
injury exceeds one-half. See note 53 infra. 
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care.33 In either case, it does not sound like the interpretation of 
"ordinarily does not occur" implicit in Dacus. 
Now you might think that all these cumbersome statements 
about probabilities reduce to the same thing. In the next Section, 
however, I will show that they do not, just as the a:hticlinal qual-
ity of Brannon and Dacus would suggest. You might also object 
that the interpretation of "ordinarily does not occur" that I be-
lieve undergirds Dacus is too simplistic or literalistic, and that 
the putatively strained exegesis in Brannon is more faithful to the 
res ipsa doctrine, properly understood. Perhaps so. But to em-
brace this view is to concede that the "ordinarily does not occur" 
language - the core of the res ipsa doctrine as conventionally 
formulated - is replete with ambiguity. Furthermore, this latent 
ambiguity is of a more than perverse academic interest, for it can 
manifest itself in disconcerting ways, as the juxtaposition of cases 
like Brannon and Dacus reveals. 
I trust, therefore, that it is not too late to suggest that the 
phrase "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" 
can be clarified and improved, and that it is appropriate to pay 
careful attention to the possible meanings of the phrase and their 
implications. To express the conceivable meanings with precision 
and clarity, the language of mathematics is, perforce, invaluable. 
Consequently, the next Section of this Article will amplify the 
possible interpretations of the "ordinarily does not occur" notion 
and translate them into a simple and convenient symbolism. 
After a brief discussion of the problem of quantifying the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, a simple formula called 
Bayes's Theorem, which relates the pertinent probabilities, will 
be derived. Finally, I will apply Bayes's Theorem to reach area-
sonably accurate and workable specification of what is properly 
meant by the "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence" requirement. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF PROBABILITY THEORY 
A. Notation 
As we have seen, "ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence" might mean any number of things. It could be, and 
arguably has been, taken to signify (1) that the probability of the 
injury given the exercise of reasonable care is quite small, (2) that 
33. See note 18 supra. 
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the probability of the injury given reasonable care is smaller than 
the probability of the injury given negligence, or (3) that the 
probability of the injury given reasonable care is much smaller 
than the probability of the injury given negligence. A few symbols 
can express these possible interpretations succinctly. The proba-
bility of injury given reasonable care will be denoted by P(I IR), 
and the probability of injury given negligence by P(I IN). It will 
also be helpful to represent the (unconditional) probability of 
injury by P(I), the probability of negligence by P(N), and the 
probability of negligence given the fact of the injury by P(N I I). 34 
In medical malpractice cases like Brannon and Dacus, then, 
P(I) stands for the chance that a patient like the plaintiff will be 
injured during the surgery. P(N) represents the probability that 
the defendant surgeon will be negligent in performing the opera-
tion. It may be thought of, in the retrospective context of litiga-
tion, as a best estimate of the chance that the defendant acted 
negligently, given all the information in the case about the sur-
geon, the surgery, and the patient, but not yet considering that 
the plaintiff was injured by the surgery and that no direct evi-
dence of negligence has been adduced. In other words, P(N) de-
notes the best assessment of the probability of defendant's negli-
gence on the basis of everything but the plaintiff's res ipsa argu-
ment.35 P(I IR) is the likelihood that a surgeon who exercises rea-
34. Negligence and reasonable care are defined so as to be mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive. That is, either defendant exercised reasonable care, or defendant 
was negligent, so that 
P(N) + P(R) = P(N) + P(-N) = 1, 
where "-N" means "not negligent." It follows that 
P(N JI) + P(R I I) = 1. 
See note 53 infra. 
35. For reasons that will be evident when Bayes's Theorem is introduced, P(N) can 
be called the "prior probability" of negligence, and P(N I I) the "posterior probability" of 
negligence. As a first approximation, P(N) might be based entirely on the incidence of 
malpractice among local surgeons. A more refined estimate might depart from the overall 
incidence of malpractice to take account of, among other things, the medical school 
attended by the surgeon, performance as an intern and resident, and the timing of the 
operation (early or late shift, early or late in the week). 
As one departs from the general category and moves to the details of the particular 
operation, the "objective" or "frequency" approach to measuring P(N) must be replaced 
with a "subjective" or "personalistic" definition. See generally, e.g., T. FINE, supra note 
1; H. KYBURG, supra note 1; Carnap, Two Concepts of Probability, in READINGS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 438 (1953). The "subjective" interpretation of probability state-
ments is perhaps the most conducive to a description of legal factfinding. See, e.g., Ball, 
The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, in EssAYS ON PROCE-
DURE AND EVIDENCE 84 (1961); Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A 
Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. ToL. L. REv. 538 (1969). Contra, L. 
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sonable care will injure the patient, while P(I IN) is the probabil-
ity that a negligent surgeon will injure the patient. Since, by 
definition, reasonable care should diminish.the probability of in-
jury and negligence should enhance it, 38 one would expect P(I IR) 
to be less than P(I IN), and P(I) - the overall probability of 
injury associated with the medical procedure, as administered by 
the surgeon in question, for patients like the plaintiff - to fall 
somewhere between the two. Finally, P(N I I) denotes the proba-
bility that the surgeon was negligent, taking into account the fact 
of injury to the patient (in addition to the information considered 
in assessing P(N)). · 
With this notation, and using the symbol "< .,, to denote 
"less than" and "<<" to denote "much less than," the inter-
pretations of "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence" that were enumerated above can be written as follows: 
P(IIR) << 1 
P(IIR) < P(IIN) 




If we designate the ratio of P(I I R) to P(I I N) by the letter f, 
then the three interpretations can be expressed as: 
P(I IR)<< 1 
f < 1 




Significantly, the res ipsa doctrine is concerned with none of 
these probabilities directly. The correctness of the res ipsa infer-
ence - inferring negligence from the fact of injury - depends 
instead on P(N I I), the likelihood that the defendant surgeon was 
negligent, given the plaintiff's injury.37 If this probability is too 
small, the res ipsa inference is inappropriate;38 if it is large 
COHEN, supra note 3. Under this interpretation, statements about the frequency of negli-
gence, for example, can be transcribed into statements about the certitude of a rational 
juror's belief in negligence. See, e.g., H. PAZER & L. SWANSON, MODERN METHODS FOR 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1972). Given a few plausible postulates (that in effect define the 
normative notion of rationality, see note 7 supra), these subjective probabilities obey the 
rules derived from the standard axioms of probability theory. See, e.g., L. SAVAGE, FoUN• 
DATIONS OF STATISTICS (2d ed. 1972); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual 
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1347-49 (1971). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); 
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
37. Regarding P(NI I) as the crucial probability is something of an oversimplification, 
but it is helpful for preliminary analysis and is corrected in text at notes 64-75 infra. 
38. But see note 12 supra. 
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enough, the inference is justified. 39 When cases like Dacus profess 
that the inference is proper as long as injuries do not ordinarily 
occur if reasonable care is exercised, they are in effect asserting 
that as long as condition 1 holds, P(N I I) is large enough to 
support the inference. 40 
To test this assumption, we must first clarify the meaning of 
"large enough," a task that can be accomplished by looking to the 
burden of proof that the law imposes on the plaintiff. In tort 
cases, plaintiffs are said to have the burden of proof: they must 
establish all the essential elements of the tort by a preponderance 
of the evidence if they are to prevail. It would seem that an 
element is established by a preponderance of the evidence if, after 
weighing all the evidence, a reasonable juror is persuaded that it 
is more likely than not that the element exists.41 Thus, a jury 
should favor the plaintiff on the issue of negligence if and only if 
it reasonably believes the probability of negligence given the evi-
dence adduced at trial exceeds one-half. For the plaintiff to avoid 
a directed verdict for the defendant where sole reliance is placed 
on res ipsa, P(NI I) likewise must exceed one-half.42 This result 
may also be derived from more basic assumptions, using the con-
cept of utility. 43 
39. Subject to the caveat of note 12 supra, the converse proposition should also hold. 
An adequate statement of the res ipsa doctrine should express the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the inference of negligence to be justified. For brevity, however; I shall 
mostly ignore stating and proving converses. 
40. On the other hand, cases like Brannon, which require a "balance of the prob-
abilities" in favor of negligence, are either stating that the res ipsa inference is proper if 
P(N I I) > .50, or they are assuming that if condition 2 holds, P(N I I) is large enough to 
warrant the conclusion of negligence. See note 18 and text at pote 34 supra. Under this 
first interpretation, the "balance of the probabilities" test merely states the standard of 
proof generally used in civil litigation. See text at notes 41-43 infra. Under the second 
interpretation, the test is misconceived, for condition 2 does not imply that P (NI I) is 
large enough to support the inference. See Subsection II.B. infra. 
41. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 35; Cullison, supra note 35, at 569-71; Lempert, supra 
note 6, at 1034 n.38; Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAw & SoCY. REV. 
335, 337 (1971). Contra, L. COHEN, supra note 3, at 75. 
42. A more refined analysis would require that P(N i I&F) > .50 where F is the fact 
that the plaintiff relied on res ipsa. See text at notes 58-60 infra. To a first approxima-
tion, however, the statement in the text is accurate. 
For additional discussion of the relation of P(N 11) to directed verdicts, see Tribe, 
supra note 35, at 1339 n.33, 1361 nn.101-02. For cases that can be read as holding that 
negligence may be found if P(N I I) > .50, see, e.g., Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P .2d 1138, 1139 
(Alaska 1978); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975) Siverson 
v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962); Sommers v. Sisters of 
Charity, 277 Or. 549, 555, 561 P.2d 603, 606-07 (1977); Austin v. Sisters of Charity, 256 
Or. 179, 187-88, 470 P.2d 939, 943 (1970); Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 358, 444 P.2d 
558, 562 (1968); Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974). 
43. If the utilities of correct and mistaken verdicts do not depend on whether the 
verdicts favor plaintiffs or defendants, it can be shown that utility will be maximized by 
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Knowing what value of P(N I I) is "large enough" to justify 
the res ipsa inference, 44 we can turn to the problem of relating this 
the following decision rule: decide for the plaintiff if P(N I I) > .60; otherwise, decide for 
the defendant. Such derivations are presented in, e.g., Ball, supra note 36, at 101; 
Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1071-72; Lempert, supra note 6, at 1032-36; Tribe, supra note 
36, at 1278-81. 
Although the mathematics of maximizing utility is not unduly 'complicated in this 
context, how the magnitude of these entities might be determined is a deep problem. In 
thinking about the design of legal rules, one can posit rational J •dges or legislators who 
state legislative preferences - what they think is best for society - for outcomes with 
differing risks. If these risk-related preferences obey a few plausible axioms (which expli-
cate the notion of rationality), von Neumann-Morgenstern (N-M) utilities can be used to 
construct the matrix. These utilities do not presuppose any natural, universal unit for the 
measurement of utility, and the numerical scale that is derived from the N-M "standard 
gamble" procedure is arbitrary in that it can always be stretched and shifted by a linear 
transformation. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 7, at 420-36; cf. Tribe, supra note 36, at 
1379-80 (obtaining numerical values for N-M utility functions). 
The utilities could also be cast in neoclassical terms. Rather than merely ranking 
preferences, the utility functions would then measure the actual strength of preferences. 
, Even though these utilities might be normalized (emphasizing that they are measured 
only in relative units) once this scale is established, meaning would have to be attributed 
to differences in magnitude. Although economists tend to eschew this neoclassical concep-
tion of utility, some philosophers interested in the design of legal and other basic social 
institutions find such cardinal utility functions helpful. See, e.g., R. SARTORIOUS, INDIVID· 
UAL CONDUCT AND SocIAL NORMS (1976). The "regret matrices" employed in some discus-
sions of jury fact-finding also lend themselves to a cardinal interpret11tion. See, e.g., 
Lempert, supra note 6, at 1032. 
In important instances, however, P(N I I) > .60 is not sufficient to warrant the infer-
ence of negligence. This is so because the equations displayed so far make no provision 
for the legitimate doubt that can arise when plaintiff relies only on the circumstances of 
the injury to prove negligence although he has access to evidence that would permit a 
more particularized showing. This argument from nonproduction, as I call it, is considered 
in detail in text at notes 68-69 infra. Its significance in these direct res ipsa cases is dis-
cussed in note 68 infra. An analogous argument helps explain the reluctance of courts to 
permit exclusive reliance on statistical evidence in many circumstances. See, e.g., Kaye, 
Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (forthcoming); Kaye, The Pardox of the Gate-
crasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101. But see M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE 
METHODS IN LAW 69-78 (1978); Tribe, supra note 36, at 1360. 
Professor Tribe is highly skeptical of this entire utility approach. See Tribe, supra 
note 35, at 1378-86. However, most of his criticisms are peculiar to the criminal context 
in which he advances them. His suggestion that utilities may be functions of probability 
is reminiscent of Professor Allais's critique of the N-M utility functions on which decision 
theory relies. W. BAUMOL, supra note 7, at 428 n.8; H. RAIFFA, DECISIO.N ANALYSIS: INTRO· 
DUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968). This objection, even if valid, 
would not detract from the analysis presented here, which requires only that for every 
probability level, the utility matrix be symmetric with equal diagonal elements. 
44. Although a fair amount of effort was expended to establish that P(N I I) > .60 
warrants an inference of negligence from the fact of injury, it turns out that the conclusion 
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probability to the three probabilistic interpretations of the crucial 
phrase "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence." 
To see the connection in a concrete case, consider the possible 
outcomes of surgical procedures like the ones in Brannon and 
Dacus. At the outset, the surgeon performs the operation either 
negligently or with reasonable care. In the notation introduced 
earlier, the probability of negligence is P(N), and that ofreasona-
ble care is P(R) = 1 - P(N). Now, if the doctor is negligent, two 
things can happen: the patient can be injured, or the patient can 
be fortunate and sustain no injury. The probability of injury, 
given negligence, we designatedP(I IN); that ofno injury despite 
negligence can be denoted P(-I IN). Simila.rly, if the physician is 
not negligent, the same two outcomes, injury or no injury, are 
possible, and the respective probabilities can be written P(I IR) 
and P(-I IR). The probabilities of each ·of the four possible out-
comes are now easily computed, as shown in the tree diagram 
below: 
Probability Outcome or Probability Outcome or Joint Probability 
Event 1 (Conditional) Event 2 Outcome (Joint) 
(Negligence (Injury or 
or Reason- No Injury) 
able Care) N &I 
(patient 
P(IINJ I- ::::rd, - P(N&Il = P(NlP(IIN) 
N negligent) 
N &-I 





P(I~ I--- injured, ---P(R&Il =[1-P(Nl I P(IfRl 
----- doctor not 
R negligent) 
------ R&-I 
P(:~-I-- (patientOK,_p(R&-Il =[1-P(N)JP(-IIRJ 
doctor not 
negligent) 
to be drawn as to the proper meaning of "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
negligence" is not very sensitive to this value. Demanding that P(N II) exceed .40 or .60, 
for example, would not affect the results that will be obtained. 
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The probabilities at the right are called "joint" probabilities be-
cause they concern outcomes determined by two different events 
(negligent or not; injured or not) occurring in combination. To 
write these expressions for the joint probability of each outcome 
I have used the definition of conditional probability: the proba-
bility of an outcome A conditional on outcome B is defined as the 
probability of the joint occurrence of A and B divided by the 
probability of B.45 In symbols: 
P(AI B) - P(A&B) 
- P(B) (4) 
Using this definition of conditional probability further, we 
can express P(N II) - the single probability on which the res ipsa 
inference turns - in terms of the probabilities in the tree dia-
gram. If, in equation 4, A stands for negligence (N) and B for 
injury (I), the definition states that 
P(NII) - P(N&I) 
- P(I) 
Multiplying numerator and denominator by P(N) and substitut-
ing P(I&N) for P(N&I)46 yields 
P(N I I) = P(N) P(l&N) 
P(I) P(N) 
Recognizing that P (l&N)/P(N) = P(IIN),47 we obtain 
P(N II) = P(N)P(IIN) (5) 
P(l) 
Looking at the branches of the tree diagram terminating in outcome I, 
we find that P(l) = P (either N&I or R&I) = P(N&I) + P(R&I) = 
P(N)P(IIN) + (1-P(N))P(IIR). Substituting this into equation 5 gives 
the popular version of Bayes's Theorem:48 
45. This forinuia may be interpreted as stating that the probability of A given B is 
the frequency with which A occurs out of all cases in which B occurs. Another way to view 
this definition, which may ma~!:) its meaning more transparent, is to express it in the 
equivalent form P(A&B) = P(AIB)P(B). This statement reads that the probability that 
the outcomes A and B will occur is equal to the probability that A will occur if B occurs 
times the probability that B occurs. To borrow an illustration, suppose that A stands for 
a warm day and B for a sunny day. Then the definition of conditional probability tells us 
that the probability that it will be both warm and sunny equals the probability that it 
will be warm if it is in fact sunny times the probability that it will be sunny. Lempert, 
supra note 6, at 1022 n.10. 
46. Since the joint outcome I & N is identical to the joint outcome N & I, the 
associated probabilities are the same. For example, the probability that tomorrow will be 
warm and sunny equals the probability that tomorrow will be sunny and warm. 
47. This follows from equation 4, with A = I and B = N. 
48. For other versions and derivations of Bayes's rule, see, e.g., Bayes, An Essay 
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P(N)P(IIN) 
P(N I I) = P(N)P(IIN) + (1-P(N))P(IIR) (6) 
Next, we divide both the numerator and denominator by P(N)P(I IN): 
0 • 
1 
P(NII) = (1-P(N)) P(IIR) 
1 + P(N) P(IIN) 
Letting f stand for the fraction;~::~~ 
as we did in expressions 2 and 3, we find 
1 
P(NII) = 1+ (1-P(N)) f 
P(N) 
which in simpler form reads: 
1 
P(N I I) = --1--f-+-f/-P(_N_) _ 
2. Application 
(7) 
With this form ofBayes's Theorem, we can outline the condi-
tions under which a jury should be permitted to conclude that 
P(NI I) exceeds .50, i.e., that the defendant was probably negli-
gent. Two distinct situations support the inference of negligence 
from the fact of injury. In what might be termed the direct res 
ipsa cases, no recourse to the probabilities P(I IN) and P(l lR), 
which determine P(N I I), is required. Instead, P(N II) itself is the 
immediate subject of speculation or testimony. This probability 
is estimated directly, on the basis of what the courts call 
"common experience"49 or, in some cases, expert testimony.50 
Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, With Richard Price's Foreward and 
Discussion, 53 PHILOSOPIDCAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE RoYAL SOCIETY 370 (London 1763), 
reprinted in FACSIMILES OF Two PAPERS BY BAYES (W. Deming ed. 1963); H. BRUNK, supra 
note 1, at 28-29; J. FREUND, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 52-58 (1962); G. Box & G. Tuo, 
BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (1973); H. RAIFFA, supra note 43. The over-
enthusiastic use of Bayes's rule has often been criticized. See, e.g., 1 W. FELLER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPUCATIONS 114 (2d ed. 1957); Brilmayer 
& Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 116 
(1979). 
49. See cases cited in note 14 supra. 
50. In the medical malpractice area, the courts tend to reject Jay estimates and insist 
on expert testimony pertinent to P(N JI). See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 
534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975). See also Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 537-38, 512 P.2d 
539, 550 (1973). 
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Brannon, for example, is a case of this type.61 That decision's 
reference to the "balance of the probabilities" can best be under-
stood as stating the usual civil burden of proof in the res ipsa 
context.52 The proposition that the probabilities point to negli-
gent causes rather than nonnegligent causes is equivalent to the 
condition that P(NI I) > .50 and therefore justifies a finding of 
negligence. 53 
In another type of res ipsa case, however, the testimony bears 
on P(N I I) only indirectly, through estimates of other conditional 
probabilities. In Dacus, for instance, the court allowed that 
P(NI I) could be taken to exceed .50 merely because paralysis 
rarely results from a carefully executed mastoidectomy, i.e., be-
cause P(I IR) < < 1. In these indirect res ipsa cases, one must go 
beyond the traditional observation, central to the direct cases, 
that "[a]ll that is needed is evidence from which reasonable men 
'can say that on the whole it is more likely that there was negli-
gence associated with the cause of the event than that there was 
·not."54 One must ask which of the possible interpretations of 
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" permits 
51. A useful' illustration of this mode of argument in a res ipsa case not involving 
malpractice is provided by Hakensen v. Ennis, 584 P .2d 1138 (Alaska 1978). Mr, and Mrs, 
Simonsen set off with their two grandchildren by car to Seattle. Only Mrs. Simonsen knew 
how to drive. The remnants of Mr. Simonsen's body were found on a sandbar in a river 
in British Columbia. Neither the car nor the other bodies were located. Alleging that Mrs. 
Simonsen's negligence resulted in the automobile's plunging into the river, the mother of 
the two grandchildren brought a wrongful death action. The defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that she was entitled to bring 
the case before the jury by virtue of res ipsa loquitur. The state supreme court observed 
that there were a variety of possible explanations for the disappearance, and that many 
of these, such as brake failure, the actions of another driver, or criminal activity, did not 
involve negli~ence. It reasoned that the probability of injury due to such nonnegligent 
causes (P(-Nln) was at least as large as the probability of injury due to defendant's 
negligence (P(N.11)). Hence, the court, on its evaluation of the probabilities, correctly 
affirmed the summary judgment for defendant. For another discussion of the probabilities 
and their application to unexplained car accident cases, see Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2-6. 
52. See notes 18 & 40 supra. 
53. For the probabilities to favor negligent causes over nonnegligent ones, P(N I I) 
> P(-N II). Since P(-N II) = 1 - P (NII), itfollows that P(N I I) > .60, That P(-NII) =l • 
P(NII) is established by the following elementary proof: 
P(I) = P(I) 
P(I) = P((-N & I) or (N & I)) 
P(I) = P(-N & I) + P(N & I) 
P(-N &f) = P(I)-P(N &I) 
P(-N & I)/P(I) = 1 - P(N & I)/P(I) 
P(-N II) = 1 - P(N II) 
54. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 39, at 218. 
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reasonable persons to say that it is more likely that negligence 
caused the injury than not. Does this conclusion that P(N I I)°> 
.50 follow from condition 1, P(IIR) << 1, which asserts that 
injuries are unusual when reasonable care is employed? Is it val-
idly drawn on the strength of condition 2, f < 1, which states that 
injuries are less frequent when reasonable care is taken than when 
negligence is at work? Or. is it best predicated on the stronger 
condition 3, f < < 1, which demands that injuries be far less 
frequent when reasonable care is taken? I shall argue that, except 
in a limited class of cases, condition 3 is the most appropriate 
standard for permitting the res ipsa inference. 
According to equation 7, whether P(N I I) exceeds .50, as it 
must to justify the res ipsa inference, depends on both P(N), the 
prior probability of negligence,. and f, the ratio of the relevant 
conditional probabilities. In fact, P(N I I) is determined by these 
variables in such a way that unless P(N) is very small, none of 
the conditions 1 through 3 strictly implies P(N I I) > .50.55 For 
example, imagine that nine out of ten doctors performing surgery 
55. If P(N) is very small, then condition 3 best justifies the inference of negligence. 
The proof is straightforward. For P(NII) to exceed .50, it follows from equation 7 that 
P(N) 
f < 1-P(N) 
For very small P(N), the denominator 1-P(N) can be approximated by 1, and we have 
f < P(N) 
Finally, since by hypothesis, P(N) is itself much less than one, this last equation becomes 
f <<' 1. 
In effect, by focusing attention on a small portion of the f-P(N) plane, we have been able 
to overlook the dependence of P(N II) on P(N) without sacrificing much accuracy: 
f 
1 
1/2 -- 1 P(N) ~ region in which /l's negligence may be 
'--.- . . P(N) 
L mferred 1f f < l-P(N) region in which /l's negligence may be • inferred if f < < 1 
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to remove meningoceles exercise reasonable care and nothing sug-
gests that the operation in question departs from the usual. Then 
P(N) = .10. Assume also that if reasonable care is not taken, the 
chance of injury to the patient is quite high, say, P(IIN) = .90. 
·Finally, suppose that the operation is a dangerous one even with 
the best of care.; so that P(I IR)= .80. This gives f = .80/.90 = .87 
< 1, so condition 2 is satisfied. Inserting these values into equa-
tion 7 gives P(N I I)= .11. Ifwe have confidence in these hypothet-
ical values for the variables, we should not conclude that the 
defendant had been negligent simply because the patient was 
injured. Thus, condition 2 - that f < 1 - is not sufficient to 
establish defendant's negligence at a high enough probability to 
meet the appropriate burden of proof. Comparable counterexam-
ples eliminating conditions 1 and 3 can also be constructed. 00 
Nevertheless, there are grounds for preferring condition 3 
over 1 or 2. To. begin with, we can dispose of the literalist view of 
"ordinarily does not occur" expressed in condition 1 as the least 
suitable of the trio. Equation 7 reveals that P(N I I) is not influ-
enced as much by P(I I R) in isolation as by the ratio f of P(I I R) 
to P(I IN). Consequently, conditions 2 and 3 are both more closely 
connected to the crucial probability P(N II), and we are left to 
choose between (2) f < 1 and (3) f < < 1 as a better statement 
of the res ipsa doctrine.57 
To make this choice, we must advert to a. facet of res ipsa 
cases we have not yet considered. Thus far, we have modeled the 
res ipsa inference by a single equation that shows how knowledge 
of the plaintiff's injury should transform the prior probability of 
negligence, P(N), into the posterior probability of defendant's 
negligence, P(N I I). In effect, we have assumed the judge or jury 
has some unarticulated estimate of the likelihood of defendant's 
56. Imagine now that as before P(N) = .10, that P(I IN)= .90, but thatP(I IR) = .10. 
In other words, the operation is not so inherently risky. Then both P(l f R) and fare small, 
·but the posterior probability of negligence still does not exceed (although it happens to 
equal) .50. 
57. I am assuming that a verbal translation of the equation 
-~P(N) 
f < 1- P(N) 
which satisfies the constraint P(N LI) > .50, see note 55 supra, is unsuitable for reasons 
of policy and practice. For a detailed discussion of problems engendered by requiring a 
juror to quantify P(N), P(IIR), and P(IIN), and to reason explicitly as Bayes's rule pre-
scribes, see Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 4; Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on 
"Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARv. L. REv. 1801 (1971); Tribe, A Further Critique of 
Mathematical Proof, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1810 (1971); Tribe, supra note 35. 
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negligence based on all the available information except that 
relating to the res ipsa aspect of the case, and we have shown how 
this probabilistic judgment should be modified to take account 
of plaintiff's injury and the circumstances under which it oc-
curred. Although useful, this simple model omits an important 
aspect of the res ipsa problem: the factfinder has more informa-
tion than is reflected in P(N Ii). He also knows the plaintiff has 
relied on the res ipsa doctrine and has not brought forward inde-
pendent, direct evidence of defendant's negligence.58 Unless this 
failure to produce direct evidence of negligence is explained or 
explicable, the factfinder would seem justified in revising his esti-
mate of the probability that defendant's negligence caused plain-
tiff's injuries.59 
One way to account for this aspect of the res ipsa problem 
in mathematical terms is to treat plaintiff's failure to come for-
ward with direct evidence of negligence (which we may call F) as 
an additional datum that modifies P(N.11). If we let N* stand for 
NI I, and R* stand for R II, then the probability on which the res 
ipsa inference turns is no longer P(N 11), but rather P(N* IF). This 
expression for P(N I I) as modified by F thus represents the proba-
bility that the defendant was negligent, given everything· known 
about the accident and the additional fact that the plaintiff has 
not pointed to any particular act of negligence by the defendant. 60 
Only if this probability exceeds .50 is the inference of negligence 
warranted. 
This new quantity P(N* IF) can be expanded as prescribed 
by Bayes's rule. Analogous to equation 7, we have 
58. Sometimes, however, a plaintiff may attempt to prove specific allegations of 
negligence while simultaneously relying on res ipsa. E.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, 
Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 40, at 232-33; Carpenter, 
supra note 12, at 176-77. 
59. For general commentary on the significance of a party's failure to produce favora-
ble evidence, see, e.g., authorities cited in Beaver, Nonproduction of Witnesses as Deliber-
ative Evidence, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 221, 221 n.1 (1978); Saltzburg, A Special Aspect 
of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 
66 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1978). For Bayesian analysis of spoliation evidence, see Kaplan, 
supra note 6; Kaye, supra note 43, at 106-08. 
60. This probability can also be written asP(N I I&F)- explicitly denoting the proba-
bility that the defendant was negligent given that the injury has occurred (I) and that the 
plaintiff has failed to point to specific negligence on the part of the defendant (F). See 
Lem pert, supra note 6, at 1044-45. As this notation suggests, P(N* IF) does not gener-
ally equal P(NIF). See id. at 1042. 
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1 (8) • 
P(N*I F) (1-f*) + f*/P(NI I) 
P(FlR*) 
where f* ·= P(F I N*) 
(9) 
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• According- to equation 9, the magnitude of P(N* IF) depends on 
P(N I I), the probability of the defendant's negligence considering 
everything in the case except for plaintiff's failure to adduce evi-
dence of specific negligence, and f*, the ratio of two conditional 
probabilities pertaining to this gap in the plaintiff's case. This 
equation thus relates the new probability P(N*I F), which takes 
account of all facets of a res ipsa case, to the probability P(N I I) 
discussed in this simpler model. As we saw from equation 7, 
P(NII) is partly determined by f; accordingly, we have at hand a 
formula to connect the competing interpretations 2 and 3 of 
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence" (which 
pertain to f) to the final probability P(N* I F) ( which determines 
the validity of the res ipsa inference). In particular, for P(N* IF) 
to _exceed .50 and thereby justify an inference of negligence, 
P(N I I) must be large enough to satisfy the inequality61 
P(NII)> .L (lO) 
l+f* 
61. Equation 8 states that 
PCN*IF> =u ... + r}PCNII> 
For P(N* I F) to exceed .50 we must have 
1 
,5o < 1-f" + f* /P(N I I) 
Crossmultiplying, 
f" 1 - f" + P(NII) < 2 
r(P(~II) -1] < 1 
1 1 
P(NII) -l < f" 
1 1 l+f* 
P(NII) < f"+ l = °""1"' 
f" 
P(N II) > l + f" 
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Substituting the expansion of P(N I I) given by equation 7 and 
solving for f establishes that P(N* IF). exceeds .50 only if62 
f<.!:_ P(N) (11) 
fl' 1-P(N) 
This result is identical to that derived from the simple model 
in all respects save one. Under equation 7, it can be shown that 
P(N II) exceeds .50 whenever 
P(N) 
f < 1-P(N) 
Expression 11 thus contains the multiplicative factor 1/f* missing 
from the simpler model, so that the critical size of f is inversely 
proportional to f*. As a consequence, whenvever the plaintiff's 
reliance on res ipsa itself suggests an f* > 1, especially small f's 
will be required to warrant an inference of negligence. Unless 
P(N) is very large indeed, any f* that is substantially larger than 
one will necessitate that f be considerably less than one. 63 The 
conclusion to be drawn from expression 11, then, is that in the 
indirect res ipsa cases in which we can usually expect f* to be 
large, the frequency of correct decisions should be enhanced by 
adopting condition 3 - that f < < 1 - and not the weaker 
condition 2 - that f < 1. 
62. Substituting the expression for P(N I I) given in equation 7 into equation 10 gives 
1 f" 
(1-f) + f/P{N) < 1 + f" 
Inverting the fractions, 
f l+f" 1 
1 - f + P(N) < ~ = r + 1 
Simplifying further, 
f tP~N) -~ < ~ 
1 1 1 P(N) 
f <7- llP(N)-1 = 7- 1 - P(N) 
63. If the prior probabllity of negligence is .50 and it is 3 times more likely that, the 
plaintiff would fail to produce direct evidence of negligence if the defendant was not in 
fact n~gligent despite the injury to the plaintiff, then P(N) = .50 and f" = 3. Inequality 
11 then tells us that f must be less than 1/3 if P (N* I F) is to be greater than .50. That is, 
the probability of injury to the plaintiff must be at least 3 times higher if negligence is 
assumed than if it is absent in order for it to be more likely than not that the defendant 
was actually negligent. 
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But when should we consider ff' sufficiently large to insist 
that the accident be much more likely to occur given negligence 
than in the absence of negligence? The answer depends on 
whether the plaintiff has access to direct evidence of the defen-
dant's negligence. Two situations may be distinguished. 0~ The 
first is where the only evidence presented is of the injury and its 
circumstances, and other evidence of negligence should have been 
available to the plaintiff. Here, it would seem substantially more 
likely that the plaintiff would fail to offer such direct evidence if 
that evidence were damaging - i.e., if the defendant acted rea-
sonably - than if the defendant were negligent. But this is to 
say that P(F IR*)>> P(F IN*). Hence,,from equation 9, ff' > > 1, 
and, to counterbalance this consideration, the injury must have 
been much more likely with negligence than with reasonable care. 
In the second situation, the plaintiff offers evidence only of 
the injury but lacks access to any other evidence bearing on the 
probability of negligence. 65 Here, we cannot always surmise that· 
f* > > 1. Under such circumstances, the probability that the 
plaintiff would fail to adduce such evidence is roughly the same 
whether or not the defendant was negligent. In symbolic terms, 
P(FIR*) is approximately equal to P(F'IN*), and therefore the 
ratio ff' is close to one. Accordingly, the plaintiff's nonproduction 
64. I am indebted to Richard Lempert for suggesting a similar categorization. 
65. A variety of factors may block a plaintiffs access to evidence of specific negligent 
acts. For a sampling of ways in which the plaintiff might explain a failure to make a 
particular showing and thereby justify treating r as small, see, e.g., Beaver, supra note 
59, at 229-47. 
Some jurisdictions go so far as to require that knowledge of the causes of the injury 
be more accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff. See, e.g., SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE 
CASE: REs !PsA LoQUITUR § 2:26, at 83-84 (1972). Some commentators have insisted that 
such superior knowledge on the defendant's part is essential to the application of the 
doctrine. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 12, at 472; Jaffe, supra note 12. Although, in 
some instances, this consideration might justify imposing liability in the absence of a .50 
probability of negligence (see note 12 supra) and t;he defendant's superior access ordinarily 
would justify taking f"' to be no greater than one, f"' should also be close to one where 
neither party has superior access. The defendant's superior access therefore seems too 
stringent a limitation to the res ipsa doctrine, and many courts are satisfied as long as 
each side has equal access to evidence of the causes of the accident. See, e.g., Widmyer 
v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Alaska 1978) . 
• Of course, where a defendant does have superior access to knowledge of the causes of 
the injury and yet fails to introduce any evidence tending to disprove negligence, the 
inference of negligence seems to be strengthened. In this situation, we need not require 
f < < 1. Cf. Tribe, supra note 35, at 1339 n.3 (arguing for directed verdicts in these 
circumstances). The mathematics of this situation is analogous to that expressed by 
equation 11. The likelihood ratio f however, would relate to defendant's failure to come 
forward with evidence to which he has superior access. Still, given modern discovery 
procedures, a defendant may only rarely have such superior knowledge. But see Jaffe, 
supra not.e 12. 
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does not alone warrant a requirement that f < < 1. Even in this 
situation, however, we may appropriately require f < < 1 in an 
important subclass of cases. Where the defendant offers evidence 
tending to disprove negligence, this reduces the value of P(N).66 
If it makes P(N) very small, neither P(NI I) nor P(N~I F) will be 
greater than .50 unless f is also very small.67 Although a jury 
should not necessarily be bound by defendant's evidence, it must 
weigh it; if the evidence is at all credible, it would be unreasona-
ble to accept a res ipsa theory unless f < < 1. 
To illustrate this logic, consider the case of a light plane that 
disappears in fair weather. The widow of the passenger sues the 
estate of the pilot and invokes res ipsa. She argues that, in gen-
eral, light aircraft are so well engineered and maintained that the 
chance of a mishap is slight when they are flown carefully, while 
the chance of an accident is somewhat larger when the pilot errs 
(for example, by not performing a complete preflight instrument 
check or taking on enough gasoline for the flight). Because the 
"balance of the probabilities" thus favors negligence, plaintiff 
contends that a jury should find defendant liable. 
As presented, this is an indirect res ipsa case. 68 The probabil-
66. Where the evidence directly negates specific acts of negligence (for example, 
testimony of ground control personnel shows that the pilot of a plane that collided with 
another was flying at the designated altitude), presentation of such evidence may indicate 
that the plaintiff should have been able to offer direct evidence if negligence (given injury) 
was indeed present. If so, the case is of the first type - the plaintiff appears to have access 
to the evidence that would have enabled a particularized showing of negligence. In these 
cirdumstances, the values reasonably assigned to both f- and P(N) necessitate f < < 1 to 
support a res ipsa theory. 
67. See note 55 and equation 11 supra. It is tempting to think that P(N) could always 
be taken to be small in res ipsa cases, thereby justifying the f < < 1 standard without 
recourse to be more complex argument about P(N* IF). Isn't reasonable care, after all, 
defined by reference to the norm (the "ordinary man") and negligent conduct identified 
in terms of abnormal or unusual behavior? The blanket assumption that P(N) < < 1, is 
shaky, however, for two reasons. First, there are situations in which the normally (or even 
universally) observed precautions do not amount to reasonable care. See, e.g., Low v. 
Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942). Second, even if reasonable care does predominate in an 
activity, the evidence, while not directly revealing a specific act of negligence, may sug-
gest that defendant is more likely to have been negligent than the average (randomly 
selected) person, or that he is more likely to have been negligent at the time in question. 
Consider, for instance, P(N) for an inexperienced physician - say a United States 
citizen who received his medical training in Mexico. Even if a juror were convinced that 
P(N) is small for physicians in general, he might well select some large value to charac-
terize this defendant's activities in a malpractice case. For such reasons, the analysis 
offered here takes P(N) to be much less than one only in those cases in which defendant's 
evidence justifies this premise. 
68. If the plaintiff's argument is slightly recast, however, a direct res ipsa case results. 
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ities being compared are the probability of injury given reasona-
ble care, P(II R), and the probability of injury given negligence, 
P(l IN). The plaintiff asserts that since the first probability ex-
ceeds the second (f < 1), chances are that the defendant was negli-
gent (P(NII) > .50): But f < 1 is not enough to support res ipsa 
in this situation. The stronger condition f < < 1 is more appropri-
ate, for it appears that the plaintiff had access to information that 
might have revealed specific acts of negligence yet did not pro-
duce that evidence. Rather than asking the jury to speculate 
about whether the pilot took on sufficient gas, for instance, the 
plaintiff could have produced the airport employee who was dis-
pensing gasoline when the pilot took off. That the plaintiff did not 
do so strongly suggests that the testimony would not have helped 
establish negligence (fl' > > 1) .. Of course, the testimony might 
not have disproved negligence (if it did, the .defendant presum-
ably would have offered it); but the plaintiff's failure to make 
a particularized showing of this kind attenuates the implication 
of negligence and thus justifies a verdict for the defendant un-
less the jury finds that the probability of airplane crashes is not 
slightly higher but far higher if pilots are negligent (f < < 1). 
If this latter condition is fulfilled, then there are good grounds 
for concluding that the defendant was probably negligent 
(P(N* IF) > .50) despite the plaintiff's evidentiary shortcom-
ings.69 
Suppose, however, that the plane was last seen flying over an 
island at a low altitude. The wreckage of the craft is found, nose 
down, in tidal water. The defendant's expert witness testifies that 
0 
Suppose that an expert formerly employed by the FAA as·an investigator of the causes of 
aircraft mishaps testifies that in his experience 60% of all light airplane crashes that 
occurred in good weather were the result of one simple pilot error - failing to maintain a 
sufficient supply of gasoline in the fuel tank. Unless some evidence is adduced to show 
that the pilot in this case took on enough fuel, plaintiff could argue that the "balance of 
the probabilities" favors negligence because the testimony indicates (directly, without 
recourse to Bayes's Theorem) that P(N I I) = .60 > .50. 
The argument from nonproduction applies here, however, and suggests that we may 
wish to demand an especially high P(NI I) to permit the inference of negligence. Using 
the notation previously explained in the text, we are actually interested in P(N* IF) rather 
than P(NII). According to equation 10, P(N*IF) > .50 only if 
f* 
P(NII) > 1 + f• 
In the illustration here, P(NI I) is estimated on the basis of the expert statistical testimony 
to be .60. For all f" > 1.5, P(NII) = .60 is therefore not large enough to justify the inference 
of negligence. 
69. The circumstances under which directed verdicts are appropriate in res ipsa cases 
depend on the procedural significance of the inference. See note 11 supra. 
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the weather was unstable the day of the flight and that a snow 
squall was observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The expert 
suggests that the pilot was proceeding in clear air when he en-
countered the storm and was attempting to land when the craft 
was struck by a sudden gust of wind. The plaintiff argues that 
this scenario, while possible, is not probable. She contends that, 
especially in bad weather, negligence enhances the probability of 
a crash. Because the likelihood of the accident given negligence 
exceeds the likelihood in the absence of negligence, the plaintiff 
urges that the pilot was probably negligent. 
Here, a jury may justifiably find for the plaintiff. The infer-
ence of negligence is not attenuated by the plaintiff's failure to 
delineate what took place in the minutes before the crash, for no 
one can do this. Here f"' ~- 1, and P(N*l ·F) ~ P(Nl"I); hence, 
P(N* IF) can easily exceed .50 if f is merely less than 1. · 
On the other hand, if the defendant introduces further evi-
dence tending to disprove negligence, the plaintiff should not 
prevail simply because negligence usually enhances the risk of 
injury. Imagine that in our second hypothetical incident, the de-
fendant calls to the stand an expert on aviation in the region who 
testifies that the pilot, whom he had supervised and trained, was 
skilled, attentive to problems of unstable weather in the area, and 
had approximately 3,000 hours of flight-experience. Such a pilot 
is less likely to be negligent (diminishing the value of P(N)), and 
it is therefore appropriate to require the plaintiff to show that a 
crash like that which occurred is far more likely to happen due 
to negligent pilot error than in the absence of negligence (f < < 1). 
In short, when a plaintiff attempts to prove negligence indi-
rectly, by testimony or argument directed to the frequency of 
accidents in the absence or presence of negligence, it is generally 
necessary to show that the likelihood of injury is substantially 
larger with negligence than without, and not merely that the 
"balance" of these conditional probabilities slightly favors injury 
given negligence or that injuries are rare without negligence. The 
only exception to requiring that f be much less than one would 
seem to be where the plaintiff has no access to any other evidence 
and the defendant offers no evidence tending to disprove negli-
gence. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The argument developed in this Article has been complex 
and, I fear, slightly lengthy. It may be advisable to restate my 
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essential points and to elaborate briefly on their implications. We 
began by observing that "ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence" - the traditional, indeed canonical, formulation 
of the grounds for inferring negligence from the fact of injury -
sounds simple, clear, and correct. Yet, it is none of these. Beneath 
its superficial simplicity lurks a multiplicity of possible mean-
ings. And the most natural interpretation countenances, if not 
encourages, opinions like Dacus that permit a finding of negli-
gence merely because the accident in question occurs but rarely. 711 
We therefore turned to some elementary probability theory 
to specify the proper grounds for the res ipsa inference. The first 
major step in the probabilistic analysis was the recognition that 
it is the probability of negligence given injury, P(NII), which, at 
least for a first approximation, forms the empirical foundation for 
the inference of negligence. Whenever P(N H) exceeds .50, infer-
ring negligence will produce fewer mistaken verdicts than refus-
ing to infer negligence. Ordinarily, an estimate of this probability 
either is within the direct knowledge of the jury or can be reached 
through expert testimony. The typical jury instructions - asking 
whether accidents of the kind at bar are more likely to result from 
negligence than from other causes - adequately convey this idea. 
But emphasis on (P(N I I) does not exhaust the content of the 
res ipsa inference. Indeed, if that were all there is to it, one might 
well wonder why courts and commentators' ever thought it impor-
tant to speak of what !'ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence." Bayes's Theorem, used as a scalpel to dissect the 
inference, suggests a possible motivation for the "ordinarily does 
not opcur" language. The theorem reveals that the decisive prob-
ability P(N 11) can be expressed as a function of other probabili-
ties; a~cordingly, one can think of the phrase "ordinarily does not 
occur" as a way to get at these probabilities. Unfortunately, the 
traditional phraseology fails to elucidate the relationship. In-
stead, it seems to murmur, sotto voce, that the defendant may 
be found liable as long as injuries are infrequent when reasonable 
care is taken.71 Yet, the basic teaching of Bayes's formula is that 
this factor must be considered in conjunction with the frequency 
of injuries given negligence. 
We therefore asked what relationship between these two 
probabilities most likely indicates that P(N I I) exceeds .50. The 
70. See text at notes 25-31 supra. 
71. Id. 
June 1979] Res Ipsa Loquitur 1483 
analysis was complicated by the fact that the so-called prior 
probability of negligence also affects P(N I I). We sought to cir-
cumvent that complication by considering the potential access of 
the plaintiff to more particularized evidence. That additional 
datum led us to replace P(NI I)withP(N*I F)as the crucial proba-. 
bility in res ipsa cases. Analysis of this -new quantity P(N* IF) 
then supported the general requirement that the jury find an 
injury to be much more likely to result with negligence than with-
out. In particular, using Bayes's Theorem iteratively, we justified 
the "much more likely" standard for all cases but those where the 
plaintiff has no access to any evidence that would permit a parti-
cularized showing of negligence and the defendant introduces no 
evidence tending to disprove negligence.72 
In sum, talk of what "ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence" should always be avoided. In one major category 
of cases all that is involved is a direct estimate of P(N* FF). In 
these direct cases, reference to what "ordinarily does not occur" 
amounts to surplusage, and potentially misleading surplusage at 
that. Instead, the jury should simply be instructed to find for the 
plaintiff if it is more probable that the acctdent was caused by 
some negligent act of the defendant than bysome other cause. In 
the other major category of res ipsa cases, the plaintiff relies on 
common experience or on evidence concerning the relative fre-
quency of accidents with and without negligence. In these indi-
rect cases, "ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence" is ambiguous, and seems to include but one of two vital 
ingredients in the indirect estimation of P(N*I.F). The beiiefthat 
an accident is unlikely to occur if reasonable care is taken ( or that 
it is slightly more likely to occur if negligence is present) is insuffi-
cient to support a verdict for the plaintiff. With limited excep-
tions, for an accident to warrant the conclusion that P(N* I F) 
exceeds .50, it must be the kind of accident that is substantially 
more unlikely to occur when reasonable care is observ~d. 
Of course, it may be that not many verdicts will change if 
these recommendations are adopted. But there is ample basis to 
72. Furthermore, we noted that this· logic also militates in favor of modifying the 
conventionally accepted standard in the direct res ipsa cases. As in the indirect cases, if 
probabilities are estimated solely on the basis of the frequencies of negligence and reasona-
ble care in other accidents of the same type, and if there is an unexplained lack of 
particularized proof, then negligence should not be inferred unless the probability that the 
accident resulted from defendant's negligence is substantially greater than the probability 
that the injury was a consequence of some other cause. See notes 53 & 68 supra. 
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hope that the quality of decisions in res ipsa cases will be en-
hanced. Surely, the attempt to improve on the traditional formu-
lation of res ipsa loquitur is worth the bother. The justification 
lies both in the pedantic but real concern for clarity, consistency, 
and correctness in propositions of law, and in the professional 
faith that pursuit of these goals will produce, when all is said and 
done, fairer results for all litigants. 
